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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
prosecution to overcome the presumption of the accused's inno-
cence.
The questions of burden of proof and presumptions are bound
up with the substantive law. This means the risk of not persuading
the jury is upon the prosecution. It also means that there is a duty
upon the prosecution of going forward with evidence on which the
jury can reasonably find that the facts were proved.
In capturing the truth, convenience of form should not be used
to deny rights in substance.
Frank Cuomo, Jr.
Criminal Law-West Virginia Kidnapping Statute-Single Offense
P, petitioner, was indicted under state statutory provisions for
the crime of kidnapping. The indictment charged that P kidnapped
X and transported him without his consent and against his will
with the intent of taking advantage of him to the county where this
indictment was rendered. The jury found P guilty as charged, and
the court sentenced him to imprisonment for sixty years. P urged
that the indictment was void on the basis that it did not specify
under which offense of the statute he was being charged and was
awarded a writ of habeas corpus. Held, reversed. The statute
prescribing kidnapping creates a single capital offense and not
three separate and distinct offenses even though it provides for
varying degrees of punishment depending upon the treatment
accorded the victim. Consequently, the indictment was not in-
sufficient because it failed to make reference to the punishment
sought or to the treatment of the victim. Pyles v. Boles, 135 S.E.2d
692 (W. Va. 1964).
The West Virginia statute makes kidnapping a felony and pro-
vides for the imposition of three different penalties. Conviction
under the statute is punishable by death unless the jury recom-
mends life imprisonment. If the victim is permitted to return
unharmed after ransom has been paid, the minimum sentence is
twenty years, but if no ransom has been paid, the minimum penalty
is ten years. W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 2, § 14(a) (Michie 1961).
In interpreting the statute to create a single capital offense, the
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majority of the court in the principal case held that the various
punishments which may be imposed are governed by the evidence
introduced at the trial and do not prescribe any element of the
offense. The dissenting judge took the position that a single offense,
without any grades or degrees, cannot have various penalties.
In reaching its decision, the majority of the court in the principal
case relied upon the interpretation given a similar federal kidnap-
ping statute by the federal courts. The federal act provides that
punishment shall be by death if the kidnapped person has not been
liberated unharmed and if the verdict of the jury shall so recom-
mend, or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life if the
death penalty is not imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1940). In Smith
v. United States, 360 U.S. 1 (1959), petitioner was charged by in-
formation, which did not allege whether the victim had been re-
leased harmed or unharmed. By a six to three decision the Court
held that indictment was required because the statutory offense
is sufficiently broad to justify a capital verdict. The majority based
its decision on the premise that kidnapping under the statute is a
capital offense whether or not there is an allegation that the
kidnapped person has not been liberated unharmed.
Prior to the Smith case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had
held that kidnapping was not a capital offense when the indictment
failed to allege that the victim was not released unharmed. United
States v. Parker, 103 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1939). However, the de-
cisions of the second circuit were in conflict with this view, and
the Supreme Court cited with apparent approval the dictum in
United States v. Parrino, 180 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1950), to the effect
that the allegation that the victim was not released unharmed is
not part of the offense and that a defendant has no right to be
informed before-hand of the punishment the Government seeks.
In endorsing the holding of the Smith case, the position of the
West Virginia Supreme Court appears to be that an allegation in
the indictment that the victim was released harmed is not necessary
to allow either the introduction of evidence of harm or the imposi-
tion of the death penalty. The majority of the court found that
such a position does not violate the West Virginia constitutional
provision that in all criminal trials the accused shall be fully and
plainly informed of the character and cause of the accusation,
W. VA. CoNsr. art. III, § 14, because P could have moved the court
to require the state to furnish a bill of particulars. State v. farrett,
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119 W. Va. 432, 194 S.E. 1 (1937). The dissent states that the avail-
ability of such a motion does not relax the constitutional rule relat-
ing to the sufficiency of the accusation.
There would seem to be some doubt that a bill of particulars
can be obtained in this situation, United States v. Parker, 19 F. Supp.
450 (D. N.J. 1937), and even if such relief is available, it is ques-
tionable whether it would benefit the defendant in the preparation
of his defense. It has been held that a bill of particulars is for the
purpose of informing the accused concerning the accusation of
which he stands charged and not of the particularity of the evidence
which the state expects to introduce. State v. Greer, 130 W. Va.
159, 42 S.E.2d 719 (1947). Under the court's view in the principal
case of the nature and elements of kidnapping, the specific in-
formation the defendant seeks is not an element of the offense but
of the degree of punishment. If the matter of harm goes only to
the punishment, it may be that the state would not be required,
in a bill of particulars, to set forth the punishment it intends to seek
or the requirements for such punishment that it intends to prove.
38 N.C.L. REv. 84 (1959). The dissenting judge, in Smith v. United
States, supra, argued that unless capital kidnapping cases are re-
quired to be prosecuted by indictment charging specifically that
the victim is not liberated unharmed, the defendant must await
the conclusion of the evidence to determine whether he is being
prosecuted for a capital offense.
In arriving at its decision in the principal case, the court stressed
the language of the statute relating to the minimum penalties to be
imposed as a significant indication of legislative intent to create a
single capital offense of kidnapping. The pertinent part of the
statute which was quoted by the court is as follows: "[I]n all cases
where the person against whom the offense is committed is re-
turned, or permitted to return, alive, without serious bodily harm
having been inflicted .... ." W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art 2, § 14(a)
(Michie 1961). (Emphasis added.)
Conversely, because three different factual situations are in-
volved, the dissent argued that three different offenses were created
by the statute, including a "primary offense" defined as a felony,
punishable by death or life imprisonment, and two additional of-
fenses provided for by minimum sentences of twenty and ten
years.
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In support of its contention that the legislature intended to create
a single capital offense of kidnapping, the majority of the court
cited State v. Perry, 101 W. Va. 123, 132 S.E. 368 (1926), which
held sufficient a charge in a single count of both forgery and utter-
ing. The court in that case, however, pointed out that the statute
under which the indictment was brought, makes forgery and
uttering two distinct felonies. In addition, the majority opinion in
the principal case cited with approval State v. Joseph, 100 W. Va.
213, 130 S.E. 451 (1925), sustaining a count charging that the de-
fendant owned, operated and possessed a moonshine still, under
a statute which created a single offense, and State v. Wetzel, 75
W. Va. 7, 83 S.E. 68 (1914), involving a charge that the accused
embezzled money at various times for a period of three years. The
court in the Wetzel case held that the indictment charged but a
single act of embezzlement under a statute which created a single
offense. When statutes define various ways in which a single
offense or different offenses may be committed, indictments fre-
quently have been assailed on the ground of duplicity. However,
in none of the cases relied upon by the majority of the court in the
principal case was an indictment held bad for duplicity, and the
court likewise concluded that the indictment in the instant case
was not challengable because of duplicity.
Duplicity consists of stating for one purpose two or more distinct
grounds of complaint when one of them would be as effectual in
law as both or all of them. State v. Vaughn, 93 W. Va. 419, 117
S.E. 127 (1923). Although the court has recognized that the West
Virginia law as to duplicity in indictments is somewhat confused,
State v. Howard, 137 W. Va. 519, 73 S.E.2d 18 (1952), it would
appear that the court now views duplicity as a technical defect,
whether the joinder be of misdemeanors or of felonies, and that
such a defect cannot be reached by a demurrer or motion to quash.
State v. Hudson, 93 W. Va. 435, 117 S.E. 122 (1923); State v.
Jarrell, 76 W. Va. 263, 85 S.E. 525 (1915); Lugar, Duplicitious
Allegations in Indictments, 58 W. VA. L. BEv. 18 (1956). If a
duplicitious allegation is viewed as a mere technical defect, it
would seem that the sufficiency of an indictment charging kidnap-
ping would be sustained whether the statute is construed to create a
single offense or a number of distinct offenses.
On the other hand, it is sometimes stated that offenses created
by different statutes, or those to which different punishments are
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annexed, cannot be included in the same count. 5 WHAmTON,
Cmn INAL LAW AND PNocEDuR § 1932 (12th ed. 1957). However,
it would appear that such joinder is improper not because the
offenses arise under different statutes or because they are differ-
ently punished, but because they are really distinct offenses.
Hamilton v. State, 129 Fla. 219, 176 So. 89 (1956). If this inter-
pretation be given, the sufficiency of the indictment could well
turn upon the court's construction of the statute. That is, if the
statute creates three distinct offenses, conceivably a count could
be held bad for duplicity.
Having examined the court's reasoning in the principal case, it
may be well to consider the effect of its decision. The indictment
in the principal case did not allege harm to the person kidnapped,
nor did the prosecution request the death penalty. As the statute
imposes no maximum penalties, it is difficult to see how P was
prejudiced in any way by the court's decision because he could
have been sentenced for any term of years in excess of ten. On
the other hand, the dissent points out that the jury returned a gen-
eral verdict without recommending confinement in the penitentiary
and questions how the trial court avoided imposing the death
penalty on the principle that a general verdict results in a con-
viction of the highest grade of the offense charged. At any rate,
it is probable that the application of the court's construction of
the statute could impose hardships upon one accused of kidnapping,
particularly in the preparation of his defense.
While the controversy as to the number of offenses the kidnap-
ping statute creates may involve a certain amount of quibbling
over terminology, it could more appropriately be said to reflect
an unsatisfactory statute.
Thus, as the dissenting opinion in the principal case suggests,
reappraisal by the legislature might be in order. A more desirable
solution is proposed by the American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code, which defines kidnapping as the unlawful removing of an-
other from his place of residence or business and as unlawful
confinement for any of a number of specified purposes. MODEL
PINAL CODE § 212, (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960). Kidnapping is made
a felony of the first degree unless the victim is released alive in a
safe place; otherwise, it is a felony in the second degree. The basic
reason for grading ordinary kidnapping as a second degree felony,
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despite the much higher level of punishment currently provided,
is to avoid disproportion in penalties between this offense and such
felonies as robbery, rape and burglary, especially where the removal
or confinement is a relatively minor incident to the other offense.
Note, A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, 53 COLum. L. BRv.
540 (1953).
The Model Penal Code justifies treating kidnapping as seriously
as murder or rape on the likelihood of a victim disappearing per-
manently during a kidnapping, without the possibility of proving
murder. Thus, to encourage the kidnapper to return the victim
alive, first degree penalties apply only when the victim is not re-
leased alive in a safe place. Although the reasons for the inclusion
of minimum penalties in the West Virginia statute are apparent,
the failure to provide maximum penalties, coupled with the court's
interpretation of the statute, have rendered them practically mean-
ingless.
Ralph Judy Bean, Jr.
Federal Courts-Application of Federal or State Law to
Federal Agency Litigation
In an action by the United States on a note executed by husband
and wife under a contract with the Small Business Loan Agency,
judgment was rendered against both defendants, and the wife
appealed asserting the common law defense of coverture. Held,
reversed. The court of appeals found that the law of the state
(Texas) where the contract was formed controlled. In Texas a
married woman is protected by coverture from personal liability.
The fact that the transaction was with the federal government did
not nullify or abrogate the law of that state. The dissent contended
that a loan from the federal government was a federal matter and
should be governed by federal, rather than state, law as the use of
state law would frustrate a multitude of federal programs and result
in varied treatment to the residents of the various states. United
States v. Yazell, 334 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1964).
The Small Business Act, 72 Stat. 384 (1958), 15 U.S.C. § 631
(1958), represents one of many federal programs undertaken within
the last several decades that have led to frequent legal contact be-
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